Kazakhstan's institutional framework for the nuclear sector has taken shape in effectively two years. At the referendum held on 6 October 2024, 71.12% of participants supported the construction of a nuclear power plant, with a turnout of 63.66%. The question of whether Kazakhstan needs a nuclear power plant has been answered. The next, more difficult question is how Kazakhstan's nuclear sector should be organised to ensure the safety and efficiency of nuclear power plants.

In today's circumstances, nuclear power generation remains the only viable alternative for ensuring the country's energy security. Above all, this is a question of energy supply and our country's development, since installed power generation capacity is a key indicator of the development of any economy in the modern world.

On 18 March 2025, the Agency of the Republic of Kazakhstan for Atomic Energy (the Agency) was established as a body reporting directly to the President, with the Committee for Atomic Supervision and Control (the Committee) established within it. On 25 December 2025, the 100% equity interest in Kazakhstan Nuclear Power Plants LLP (KNPP) was transferred from Samruk-Kazyna JSC into republican ownership, while the rights of possession and use were assigned to the Agency.

In September 2026, by an order of the Chair of the Agency, Kazakhstan Nuclear Power Plants LLP (KNPP) was designated as the national operator. KNPP and Atomstroyexport JSC (part of Rosatom) signed a contract for the design, procurement and construction of the first nuclear power plant. According to the Agency, the active construction phase is scheduled for 2027.

How the system is organised in Kazakhstan

The Committee is required to exercise state oversight of the safety of the future nuclear power plant, assess its compliance with established requirements, carry out licensing activities, and monitor compliance with national requirements, taking into account the applicable standards and recommendations of the IAEA. Furthermore, pursuant to its Regulations, the Committee must independently make decisions on matters concerning nuclear safety, radiation safety, and nuclear security.

Nevertheless, the Committee remains within the Agency. The Agency sets sectoral policy, exercises the state's rights in relation to KNPP, and itself participates in implementing nuclear power plant projects. Developing nuclear energy remains a key task of the Agency. In this structure, KNPP is a separate company, the national operator and the project owner; in substance, it is the lead developer of the future nuclear power plant.

It would be wrong to claim that the company constructing the nuclear power plant “issues licences to itself”: the operator and the regulator are separate entities. However, both the operator and the regulator are within the same reporting structure—that of the Agency.

Notably, the Strategy to 2050 itself calls for the Committee to acquire the status of an independent state body, in accordance with IAEA recommendations, by the time construction of the nuclear power plant is completed. The state thereby acknowledges that the current model is transitional.

What the IAEA requires

Kazakhstan ratified the Convention on Nuclear Safety by a law dated 3 February 2010. The Convention entered into force for Kazakhstan on 8 June 2010. Article 8(2) requires the state to ensure an effective separation between the functions of the regulatory body and those of organisations concerned with the promotion or utilisation of nuclear energy. The key word is “effective”.

The meaning of effectiveness is elaborated in the IAEA General Safety Requirements GSR Part 1 (Rev. 1). This is a key international standard. The IAEA uses it to review national systems during IRRS missions (Integrated Regulatory Review Service). Of the standard's 36 requirements, three groups are decisive for the present discussion:

Requirement 4 — the regulator must be protected against undue influence over safety decisions, primarily from organisations promoting nuclear energy;

Requirements 30 and 32 — the regulator establishes or adopts the rules and criteria underlying its decisions, as well as an enforcement policy;

Requirement 36 — the regulator explains to the public not only its decisions but also the reasons for them.

Equally important is what these requirements do not prescribe. They do not require a regulator to be “accountable to no one”: in all the countries we compared, the regulator's leadership is appointed by the head of state or government. Nor do they mandate any particular institutional form. They require something different: the body responsible for developing the sector must have no channels through which it can influence safety decisions. The existence of such a channel does not mean it is used; rather, the standard proceeds on the premise that such a channel should not exist.

Where the conflict lies

If the Committee's powers are assessed against criteria derived from the IAEA standard, then, in our view, the substance of the issue comes down to the following questions.

1. Who sets the rules? This is the central question. The provision on the Agency's competence in the Law on the Use of Atomic Energy contains 33 subparagraphs, 16 of which empower the Agency to approve something—from safety standards and rules and permanent supervision procedures to expert review procedures. The Agency also defines the violations for which the regulator may take urgent measures, including suspending operations, and the types of such measures. The Committee makes individual decisions, but the framework for them is largely set by the body responsible for developing the sector.

2. Who makes decisions, and who appoints the decision-maker? The Chair of the Committee is appointed by the Chair of the Agency, with the participation of an authorised personnel commission. This is a procedural safeguard, but not a guarantee against influence by the body promoting the sector. The law does not establish a fixed term of office or an exhaustive list of grounds for removal.

3. How can a representative of the Agency influence the regulator? Alongside the appointment channel, there are resource and information channels. The Committee is financed from the republican budget, but the Agency administers the budget programmes. The Committee is not a separate budget programme administrator. Expert organisations whose conclusions inform supervision are also accredited by the Agency. Under the law, operators' notices concerning planned safety-related changes and incidents are addressed to the Agency. The Committee may request information, but is not its initial addressee. This does not prove that influence is exercised; it shows that channels for such influence remain.

4. Who reviews decisions? Under Kazakhstan's Administrative Procedural and Process-Related Code, administrative complaints against inspection reports, orders and enforcement measures are reviewed by the superior body—the Agency—which may annul an act found to be unlawful. Judicial protection remains available. The issue is not the availability of judicial review but whether a body interested in promoting the sector should participate in reviewing safety decisions.

To be fair, the law also contains safeguards already in force: the Committee itself selects organisations providing scientific and technical support to the regulator, and a single organisation is prohibited from supporting both regulation and sector development. The problem therefore has two dimensions—institutional (reporting lines) and normative (allocation of powers)—and both must be addressed.

How other countries have addressed the problem

In Japan, for example, following the Fukushima Daiichi accident, a new Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA) was established in 2012, institutionally separate from the ministry responsible for developing the energy sector. Its Chair and four commissioners are appointed by the Prime Minister with the consent of both houses of parliament for five-year terms. Early removal is permitted only on an exhaustive list of grounds. Appeals against NRA decisions are considered by the NRA itself; it has no superior administrative body.

The United Arab Emirates is a newcomer to nuclear energy with a state-owned operator (ENEC). From the outset, in 2009, the UAE established a separate regulator, FANR, as a legal entity with administrative and financial independence and exclusive licensing authority. UAE law prescribes information that must be disclosed, including licences, reasons for refusals, inspection results and sanctions.

Turkey is the closest comparison to Kazakhstan in terms of technology supplier. Its regulator, NDK (Nükleer Düzenleme Kurumu—the Nuclear Regulatory Authority), is institutionally linked to the Ministry of Energy, but Law No. 7381 and Presidential Decree No. 95 of 2022 created a distinct regulatory framework for it. The Decree expressly prohibits giving instructions to the regulator or reviewing the expediency of its decisions, and the five Board members are appointed by the President of Turkey for four-year terms. An important legislative development in Turkey is also worth noting. In 2021, the Constitutional Court annulled the 2018 instrument establishing the regulator, requiring its status to be enshrined in legislation. Safeguards are more robust when set out in a law rather than subordinate regulations.

Among CIS countries other than Russia, Belarus provides an interesting example, although in our view it is more of a counterexample. The law declares the independence of Belarus's Gosatomnadzor, yet it remains a department of the Ministry of Emergency Situations, and a number of licensing decisions are formally taken by the ministry's board. Declaring independence is not enough without a corresponding allocation of powers.

The overall conclusion is that in none of the successful models is the regulator subordinate to the body responsible for promoting nuclear energy.

What should happen next?

In our view, the existing system should be reformed according to the principle of the least complex solution, without dismantling what already works. We believe the legal oversight framework needs reform in two stages.

Step one. Enshrine in law a prohibition on giving the Committee instructions concerning safety decisions, without reorganising the Committee, and exclude the Agency from the administrative review of those decisions. Require publication of reasons for licensing decisions. These changes do not require structural reorganisation and can be adopted before further major safety decisions concerning the first nuclear power plant.

Step two. Gradually transition to an autonomous regulator. Establish the Committee as a separate state body, with its status and safeguards defined by law, as envisaged by Kazakhstan's Nuclear Industry Development Strategy to 2050. Separation is meaningful only if powers are transferred with it. In our view, the regulator should: (a) establish or adopt safety requirements and grounds for supervisory measures, while leaving policy, emergency response and export controls with the Agency and the Government; (b) administer its own budget and designate expert organisations independently; (c) receive notifications of changes and incidents directly from operators; and (d) be headed by a person whose term of office, qualification requirements and absence of ties to the supervised industry are prescribed by law.

People make the difference

Institutional reforms must proceed alongside professional training in both areas: sector development and oversight.

The number of specialists in Kazakhstan is small, making lateral movement between the operator, the Agency and the regulator inevitable. This will have to be regulated, and the law should restrict transfers of specialists between the operator and the regulator in relation to the same project and provide a cooling-off period during which such a specialist does not participate in decisions concerning a former employer.

Training must start now, at the development stage: the regulator will need specialists capable of effectively reviewing design decisions that are only now being developed.

How this will improve plant safety and efficiency

Regulatory independence should not be seen as an obstacle to construction or its pace. It should become one of the conditions for establishing the nuclear sector in Kazakhstan. In our view, the proposed model benefits Kazakhstan's nuclear project in several ways.

When roles do not overlap, responsibilities are clearly divided: the operator is responsible for plant safety, the regulator for verifying it, and the Agency for developing the sector. Each actor can focus on its own mandate, while the Agency is relieved of the conflict between project deadlines and supervisory requirements. Decisions on design, construction and commissioning should rest on technical safety assessments rather than construction schedules or investment commitments.

Rules established by the regulator independently of the Agency and KNPP, and published together with reasons for decisions, make licensing more predictable. This reduces the risk of repeated approvals and disputes during construction and, in turn, the risk of delays, which are particularly costly in nuclear projects.

A model aligned with the Convention and the IAEA standard facilitates IRRS missions and cooperation with the technology supplier and foreign regulators. It also strengthens the confidence of the IAEA and the international community in the project as a whole.

Kazakhstan has already taken an important step by separating the operator from the regulator and providing for the Committee's independent decision-making. The next step is to remove the regulator from the reporting structure of the body developing the sector and grant it the powers without which that independence remains incomplete, in line with the IAEA standard. The state itself set this objective in the Strategy to 2050. It would be sensible to achieve it not by the completion of construction but earlier, by synchronising regulatory reform with the licensing timetable for the first plant.